Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law
Missouri Environmental Law and Policy Review
Volume 13
Issue 3 Summer 2006

Article 7

2006

Environmental Law Updates

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jesl
Part of the Environmental Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Environmental Law Updates, 13 Mo. Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 313 (2006)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jesl/vol13/iss3/7

This Environmental News is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri
School of Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Environmental and
Sustainability Law by an authorized editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact bassettcw@missouri.edu.

MELPR, Vol. 13, No. 3
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW UPDATES
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
United States v. Hubenka, 438 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 2006).
John Hubenka is a manager for the LeClair Irrigation District
("LID"). LID installed a diversion gate on the Wind River, which allows
the water to flow into an irrigation canal that parallels the river. Hubenka
and LID tried on several occasions to divert the flow of the river so the
irrigation canal would not be harmed. In 1994, LID, with Hubenka's
permission, constructed a dike downstream from the diversion gate using
river cobbles, scrap metal, trees, cars, and a washing machine. LID also
reinforced the river's bank with similar items. The United States Army
Corps of Engineers ("Corps") issued a notice of violation to both Hubenka
and LID and instructed them to remove all of the debris except for clean
concrete. After they complied, the Corps issued a permit to stabilize the
bank with more acceptable materials. In March of 2000, Hubenka had
three dikes constructed in the north channel of the Wind River, none of
which were authorized by the Corps. Hubenka was charged in 2004 with,
and convicted of, three violations of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") for
knowingly discharging pollutants into the Wind River.
On appeal, Hubenka made four arguments as to why he was
erroneously convicted. He first claims the river was not navigable-in-fact
nor adjacent to other navigable-in-fact waters and the dikes had no effect
on navigable waters downstream; therefore the Corps had no jurisdiction
to regulate. The Tenth Circuit declared the Corps has jurisdiction over
dredge and fill activities in navigable waters, which are waters of the
United States. Further, Corps regulations state that the CWA applies to
tributaries of navigable waters, which includes the Wind River. Hubenka
also argued that the Corps exceeded its statutory authority. The court
applied the Chevron deference test and determined the Corps had not
exceeded its statutory authority.
"Navigable waters" is defined
ambiguously by the CWA (the first step of the Chevron test) and the
Corps' rule does not "invoke the outer limits of Congress' power or raise
significant constitutional questions" (the second step). Court precedent
has determined that the Corps' rule is a permissible construction of the
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MELPR, Vol. 13, No. 3
CWA, so the rule is to be given deference as a valid interpretation of the
CWA. The court also determined that there is a significant nexus between
the tributary (Wind River) and the navigable waters downstream, so the
rule is not "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the [CWA]."
Second, Hubenka argued that he did not violate the CWA because
he did not add pollutants to the Wind River. The CWA defines
"pollutant" as (among other items) "rock" and "sand." The court stated
that according to the plain language of the statute, using river cobbles to
construct the dikes is a discharge of a pollutant.
Hubenka's third argument is that he did not violate the CWA
because the Corps could not show a deleterious effect on downstream
waters. The court made quick work of this argument, noting, "to state a
violation . . . a plaintiff need only show that the defendant discharged a
pollutant into a water of the United States . . . without a permit." Thus,

there is no need to prove that the pollutants caused a deleterious effect on
the navigable waters downstream.
Finally, Hubenka's last argument was that the district court
violated Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence "by allowing the
government to use . . . testimony to show that Hubenka acted in

conformity with prior wrongful activities." The court agreed with the
district court that the testimony was probative of whether he knowingly
violated the CWA and therefore affirmed the district court's order.
ERiN

C. BARTLEY

Utah Environmental Congress v. Bosworth 439 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir.
2006).
In October 2001, the Forest Service approved a timber-harvesting
project in Utah's Fishlake National Forest. After the project was
approved, Utah Environmental Congress ("UEC"), an environmental
organization, filed a petition for review. The petition was dismissed and
UEC appealed. On appeal UEC contended that the Forest Service 1) did
not properly select and monitor a Management Indicator Species ("MIS")
in order to determine the effects of the project on other species and 2) it
did not consider a reasonable range of alternatives to the project.
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The actual preparation for the timber-harvesting project began in
November of 1999. The project's main goal was to reduce the overall
stand density of the Spruce and Aspen trees that were at the highest risk
for beetle infestation. Before the project began, the Forest Service
conducted a study that examined the project's potential impact on wildlife,
soils, and vegetation. The study was completed in 2001, and the project
manager issued a statement that there would be no significant impact on
the surrounding area.
In order to determine whether the Forest Service properly selected
and monitored the MIS, the court looked to 36 C.F.R. 219.19. The Code
stated that in order to estimate the effects on wildlife populations, certain
species that are present in the area shall be selected and monitored. The
species should be selected based on their ability to indicate the effects of
management activity. According to this provision, the Forest Service was
required to select both an "ecological indicator" and a "high interest"
species. The service selected elk, mule deer, Bonneville cutthroat trout,
and Rydberg's milkvetch to represent the high interest species; sage-nester
guild, Southwestern Willow flycatcher, cavity-nester guild, northern
goshawk, and the Mexican spotted owl were selected for the ecological
indicators. The UEC contended that the species chosen for ecological
indicators were not proper representatives for the study. Further, the UEC
contended that the Forest Service had not gathered the proper data
regarding the species at the beginning of the study.
The district court found that when the Forest Service examined the
sage-nester guild it did not make a good faith effort to confirm the
presence of the species. As such, the agency did not comply with 36
C.F.R. 219.19. On appeal, the court stated that since the species did not
technically have a population in Fishlake National Forest, the Forest
Service did not have a duty to monitor the species. However, when the
court looked at the Southwestern Willow Flycatcher it determined that a
more stringent observation was necessary. The court stated that it was not
enough to simply state that no population existed. The Forest Service
needed to look closer because the flycatcher was an endangered species.
In terms of the remaining species' observations, the court determined that
the Forest Service had only properly monitored the northern goshawk.
The court stated that in order to properly monitor species studies need to
be conducted that provide current quantitative data on the species.
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The court next turned to the UEC's second contention that the
Forest Service did not consider a reasonable range of alternatives. The
court found that when an agency conducts a pre-study and finds that the
action will not significantly impact the environment, then the agency does
not need to prepare a full environmental impact statement. However,
because the Forest Service did not collect the proper data with regards to
most of the species the court reversed the finding of the district court and
vacated the Forest Service's approval of the project.

AMY OHNEMUS
Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Bosworth, 437 F.3d 815
(8th Cir. 2006).
The Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness ("BWCAW") Act
prohibited the use of all motorboats within the BWCAW, except on
specified lakes. The Secretary of Agriculture was given the task of issuing
quotas that restricted the use of motorboats on these lakes to "less than or
equal to the average actual annual motorboat use of the calendar years
1976, 1977, and 1978." In calculating the average use of motorboats by
resort owners, homeowners and their guests were not counted. In
response to the Eighth Circuit decision of Friends of the Boundary Water
Wilderness v. Dombeck, 164 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 1999), which concluded
that not excluding the use of certain parties was contrary to the language
of the BWCAW Act, the United States Forest Service ("USFS")
recalculated the base period use and increased the number of motorboat
permits issued by 290%.
Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness ("Friends") brought
suit alleging that the USFS lacked the authority to recalculate its use
figures, that its recalculation of these figures was arbitrary and capricious,
and that the new quotas violated the BWCAW Act. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Friends, holding that the USFS
lacked authority to recalculate the base period use and that the USFS's
recalculation was arbitrary and capricious.
On appeal the Eighth Circuit held that the BWCAW Act was silent
on the issue of whether USFS had authority to recalculate the base period
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use and that, as such, the USFS interpretation of the statute was to be
given deference. After concluding that the USFS had the authority to
recalculate the base period use, the court examined the recalculation of
each lake separately. In examining the recalculated base period use on the
Moose Lake Chain the court noted that USFS acknowledged that the
homeowner and resort owner surveys were not conducted in a statistically
valid manner. The court held that the USFS's reliance on deficient surveys
was not reasonable and that the recalculation was arbitrary and capricious.
The court also set aside the recalculation of the USFS for the Saganaga
Lake, another lake in the BWCAW. The court found that in recalculating
the base period use the USFS did not attempt to determine how many
motorboat users obtained permits because it relied on unreliable data
collected primarily from the county records. The court held that the USFS
must recalculate the quotas so that they are in compliance with the
BWCAW Act.
ERIK HOLLAND

New York v. EPA, 2006 WL 662746 (D.C. Cir. Mar.17, 2006).
In New York I, the D.C. Circuit court addressed the first of two
rules promulgated by the EPA, which provided ways for stationary
sources of air pollution to avoid triggering the New Source Rule ("NSR").
The court upheld in part and vacated in part the first rule. This case, New
York II, addresses the second rule, entitled the Equipment Replacement
Provision, which amends the Routine Maintenance, Repair, and
Replacement Exclusion from the NSR requirements.
Under the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), air pollution sources that
undergo "any physical change" that increases emissions are required to
undergo the NSR permitting process. Historically, the exclusion provided
that routine maintenance, repair, and replacement do not constitute
changes triggering the NSR. Thus, this provision would allow pollution
sources to avoid the NSR when replacing equipment under the twentypercent pollution cap, even if there is a resulting increase in emissions.
The court vacated the second rule, the Equipment Replacement Provision,
because it is contrary to the plain language of the CAA. The CAA defines
317
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modification as any physical change in, or change in the method of
operation of, a stationary source which increases the amount of any air
pollutant emitted by such source or which results in the emission of any
air pollutant not previously emitted. Previously, maintenance, repair, and
replacement had been excluded from the NSR, because the EPA found
routine maintenance and repair was a de minimus circumstance and could
be excluded from the rule.
However, the court held that routine maintenance, repair, and
replacement was a modification under the Act. The court specifically
rejected the argument that "modification" was an ambiguous term and,
employing traditional tools of statutory construction, found that "any
physical change" includes equipment replacements. Once the EPA
determines that an activity constitutes a physical change, the court held,
the statute is read broadly and the word "any" requires the activity be
subject to the NSR requirements. The court held that "because Congress
used the word 'any,' EPA must apply NSR whenever a source conducts an
emission-increasing activity that fits within one of the ordinary meanings
of 'physical change."' The court also said that the EPA offered no reason
to conclude that the CAA supports the conclusion that "any physical
change" does not mean what it says.
The court determined it was proper for Congress to have intended
NSR to apply to any type of physical change that increases emissions.
The EPA's interpretation would produce a "strange," if not an
"indeterminate," result. It would result in a law intended to limit increases
in air pollution but would allow sources operating below emission limits
to increase the pollution they emit without government review. The court
held that by adopting an expansive reading of the phrase "any physical
change," it gave natural effect to the words used by Congress and reflected
their common meanings and purpose. The court's interpretation was
necessary to improve pollution control programs. The court held that the
Equipment Replacement Provision violated § 111 (a)(4) of the CAA, and
because it violated the CAA, the court vacated the rule.
NATALEE
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Chattooga Conservancy v. Jacobs, 318 F.Supp 2d 1179 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
Environmental
organizations,
including
The
Chattooga
Conservancy, Florida Biodiversity Project, Sierra Club, and the
Wilderness Society, brought suit against Robert T. Jacobs, as Regional
Forester of the Southern Region of the U.S. Forest Service, seeking a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to prevent the
harvest of timber from National Forest land. The district court denied the
requests because Plaintiffs failed to show a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits. This ruling clarifies an ambiguous standard set by
Sierra Club v. Martin, 168 F.3d 1 (1 1 ' Cir. 1999).
In 1990, the National Forest Service began a study of flora and
fauna believed to reside in the Ouachita Mountains. As a result of the
studies the Regional Forester signed two Records of Decision ("RODS")
regarding development of the forest which required inventory of species
considered threatened, endangered, proposed, and sensitive. In 1999, the
Martin decision seemingly forced forest services to complete a wholly
new "inventory" of species for each proposed action if the ROD contained
the word "inventory." To circumvent this requirement, Ouachita Forest
Service altered their ROD so as not to include a required "inventory" of
species, but rather an analysis of then "available information." This made
collection of new information discretionary as opposed to mandatory for
each project.
The immediate case began in 2003 when the Forest Service
approved the Wildhorse Creek Project, a plan to harvest timber within a
section of the Ouachita Mountains. As part of the "Environmental
Assessment for Timber Harvest and Connected Actions" ("EA"), the
Forrest Service prepared an analysis of effects of timber harvest on
threatened, endangered, proposed, and sensitive species. Included in the
EA was extensive available information about all species alleged to be in
the area that met the qualifications. Some of the species such as the
American Burying Beetle and the Bald Eagle were known to exist near the
area, but there was no evidence of their presence within the Wildhorse
Creek Project. The EA also indicated that the timber harvest would have
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"No Significant Impact" or a "beneficial impact[]" on each of the
examined species.
The plaintiffs were not convinced of the thoroughness of the Forest
Service's investigation and sought an injunction. The court held that the
Plaintiffs read too much into Martin in that they expected a "head count"
of the all species prior to agency action, and thus, the court denied
injunctive relief.
The court noted that Martin was ambiguous but wholly different
than the immediate case in that the defendants in Martin produced an
inadequate EA that fell far short of the Wildhorse Creek Project
assessment. The Plaintiffs' interpretation of the requirements set forth in
Martin was rejected by the court which held that, as a result, the Plaintiffs
failed to show a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits. This
decision clarifies Martin in that a "head count" inventory is not required as
long as agencies perform credible analysis based upon available
information. Regardless of this ruling, agencies should routinely make
new findings, whether they are called "inventory" or not, to keep their
available information accurate. Without such upkeep, the decisions of the
Forest Service would likely not adequately safeguard the species the
agency was created to protect.

G. MICHAEL BROWN
Mehl v. Canadian Pacific Rv., Ltd., 2006 WL 522435 (D.N.D. Mar. 6,
2006).
On January 18, 2002, a Canadian Pacific Railway freight train
derailed near Minot, North Dakota. A number of tanker cars that derailed
were seriously damaged resulting in the release of anhydrous ammonia
into the air. Seven days later a group of individuals filed suit on behalf of
themselves and a class of similarly situated individuals. The plaintiffs in
the case allege that a section of the continuous welded rail track failed,
resulting in the derailment and subsequent personal injuries and property
damage. The complaint identified seven claims, including negligence,
private nuisance, public nuisance, trespass on land, strict liability,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence per se. On
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May 4, 2005, the court granted, in part, the plaintiffs' motion for class
certification. Then on August 16, 2005 the defendant filed a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Canadian Pacific claimed that the Eight Circuit's federal preemption
precedent required dismissal of the plaintiffs' suit, relying on In re
Derailment Cases, 416 F.3d 787 (8th Cir. 2005).
The Federal Railroad Safety Act ("FRSA") was enacted in 1970
"to promote safety in every area of railroad operations and reduce
railroad-related accidents and incidents." The Act provides for the
institution of rules, regulations, orders, and standards for all areas of
railroad safety. In order for FRSA to "pre-empt state law, the federal
regulation must 'cover' the same subject matter, and not merely 'touch
upon' or 'relate to that subject matter."'
The Eighth Circuit discussed cases which pre-empted FRSA as
well as state court decisions that found that state-law tort claims were not
preempted by the FRSA. It also reviewed a number of cases decided by
the Court of Appeals itself in determining FRSA preemption including the
impact of In re Derailment Cases. This case resulted in a finding that the
negligence claims were preempted by the FRSA and that the negligence
per se and strict liability claims were not recognized by Nebraska law.
The Eighth Circuit identified in Mayor of Baltimore v. CSX Tranp., Inc.,
404 F. Supp. 2d 869 (D. Md. 2005) that "there is no indication that the
[Federal Railroad Administration] meant to leave open a state tort cause of
action to deter negligent inspection." Thus, even in the case of a failure to
inspect, plaintiffs' claims remain subject to preemption analysis. The
Eighth Circuit also referenced a more recent federal case that cited to the
In re Derailment Cases decision with approval and pointed out that the
fact that other federal district courts in the Eighth Circuit had reached a
contrary result with regard to preemption. However, each of those cases
were decided prior to the In re Derailment Cases case issued by the Eighth
Circuit on August 2, 2005.
The court also provided a summary of the other decisions relating
to the Minot derailment to provide a more succinct understanding of the
procedural and jurisdictional differences within each case.
The court then addressed each of the plaintiffs' claims
individually: inspection, construction and maintenance, training,
operation, negligence per se, strict liability, intentional infliction of
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emotional distress, nuisance, and trespass. However, the court granted the
defendants' motion to dismiss as to each claim. It noted that even if the
court were to decide that the plaintiffs' claims were not preempted by the
FRSA, allowing those claims to proceed would violate the exclusive
enforcement provision of the FRSA. The Eighth Circuit's decision
resulted in leaving the plaintiffs with no remedy for the Minot accident.
While the court acknowledged the unduly harsh result of granting the
defendants' motion to dismiss, it stated that it is the "province of
Congress, not the judicial branch" to address the inequity in preempting a
remedy for a wrong.
TRAVIS A. ELLIOTT

Int'l Ctr For Tech. Assessment v. Thompson, 2006 WL 556305 (D.D.C.
Mar. 8, 2006).
After the court granted the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants,
the United States Department of Health and Human Services and the Food
and Drug Administration ("FDA"), Plaintiffs, International Center For
Technology Assessment, filed a motion to alter or amend the court's
decision. Plaintiffs challenged the USDA's decision not to regulate the
commercialization of a genetically engineered fish and for failure to
comply with the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") and the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA").
Yorktown Technologies, L.P. ("Yorktown") engineered a line of
genetically modified pet fish and received a trademark for its "GloFish."
The fish was developed by inserting genetic constructs from sea coral
which caused the fish to glow when exposed to certain types of light.
After analyzing the legal, scientific and policy issues the FDA determined
that GloFish would not be regulated because there was no clear risk to the
public health. Plaintiffs objected to the possibility that GloFish could
"enter the animal and human food chains through accidental or intentional
releases."
Plaintiffs' complaint averred that the FDA's distinction between
food and non-food uses in the GloFish Statement was arbitrary and
capricious and that the FDA did not review Yorktown's GloFish request in
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accordance with statutory mandates. Plaintiffs also alleged that the FDA's
failures to prepare an environmental impact statement ("EIS") or an
environmental assessment before the GloFish or other genetically
modified animals were allowed to be sold violated NEPA. Plaintiffs also
asserted that the FDA violated the ESA when it failed to prepare a
biological assessment and did not consult with the Fish and Wildlife
Service ("FWS") before allowing GloFish commercialization or the
commercialization of genetically modified animals.
The court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' claim was not clear error
because the FDA's determination not to take any enforcement actions in
connection with any New Animal Drug Application ("NADA") filed by
the manufacturer was discretionary and not subject to judicial review. The
court also held that Plaintiffs failed to show Yorktown submitted a
NADA. There was not plain error because the FDA's refusal to regulate
GloFish or other genetically modified animals did not constitute a "major
federal action" under NEPA. Additionally, there was no clear error
because the FDA's decision not to regulate GlowFish did not amount to an
"agency action" that required ESA compliance. The defendant's motion
to alter or amend the court's decision was denied.
SETH

D. OKSANEN

Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Indus. Rubber Prods., 2006 WL 453207 (D.
Minn. Feb. 23, 2006).
In 2003, the Hibbing Chrysler Center ("HCC") claimed that its
vehicles were sustaining damage due to toxic particulates from the
blasting activity of Industrial Rubber Products, Inc. ("IRP"). A complaint
was made to the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, which later
determined, after visiting the site, that a hazardous waste issue was nonexistent.
Subsequently, HCC sent a cease-and-desist letter to IRP
mentioning that a lab analysis was conducted on the particulate and that it
identified IRP as the source of the damage. IRP asserted that the report
was erroneously read and mischaracterized, in actuality it did not identify
it as the source, but instead provided evidence that the damage was in
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some portion due to a chemical found in film for automotive windows and
car wax. Additional testing procedures were undertaken by both sides,
each confirming for the retaining party that its assertions of liability or
non-liability were correct.
During the course of the back-and-forth exchange between the
parties, IRP tendered a defense to its insurer, Employers Mutual Casualty
Company ("Employers"), which agreed to defend under a reservation of
rights. Employers then commenced the action underlying the instant
decision, seeking a declaration that the underlying claim by HCC was
excluded pursuant to the pollution exclusion provision of the commercial
general liability ("CGL") policy at issue. After analyzing the CGL, the
district court found that the exclusion provision controlled and that the
claims asserted against the insured fell within the exclusionary scope.
As a result, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota
granted summary judgment to the insurer, implicitly rejecting the
argument of IRP that the pollution exclusion was not applicable because
IRP had put forth evidence showing that the damage causing particulate
did not originate from its property. Thus, the district court, citing Eighth
Circuit precedent, held that the liability defenses were irrelevant to the
determination of coverage, and the coverage scope analysis must be made
by comparing the complaint allegations with the language contained in the
insurance policy.
ERIc S. OELRICH

Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Helwig, 2006 WL 618590 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 9, 2006).
Great American Insurance ("Great American") issued a primary
comprehensive general liability insurance policy ("CGLI") and an excess
policy to Avtec Industries ("Avtec"). Later, Land Trust was added as an
additional insured to the policy. William Helwig, as a beneficiary to
Land Trust, sought insurance coverage from Great American in three
actions, each of which involved claims arising from perchlorethylene
("PCE") and trichloroethylene ("TCE") pollution that allegedly emanated
from the subject property of the land trust. In the Precision claim, the
state of Illinois sought redress from Helwig and others for public nuisance.
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The Muniz case was a class action that arose out of water contamination.
Plaintiffs sought recovery for public nuisance and trespass. The LeClerqc
case was a class action in which a fourth party sought contribution from
Helwig and others under the Illinois joint Tortfeasors Contribution Act.
Great American filed an action seeking declaratory judgment that
it had no duty to defend or indemnify Helwig in the three actions. Great
American argued that the policies' pollution exclusions precluded claims
for damages caused by the pollution. Helwig filed a counter-claim
alleging that Great American owed a duty to defend him in the three
actions because the underlying complaints alleged conduct that fell within
the policy's personal injury coverage, which was unaffected by the
pollution exclusion.
The United States District Court for the Eastern Division of Illinois
addressed the issue of whether Great American owed a duty to defend
Helwig. It did not consider whether Great American owed a duty to
indemnify Helwig because it was unclear whether relief had been granted
to Helwig in any of the litigations. First, the court determined that the
exclusion was not applicable to the personal injury coverage of the policy.
The exclusion's language did not indicate that it was meant to apply to
every type of coverage within the CGLI. Because ambiguities in
insurance policies are to be construed in favor of the insured rather than
the insurer, the court interpreted this ambiguity in favor of Helwig. While
the language did state that bodily injury and property damage were
excluded, the policy's personal injury coverage provision provided
coverage for conduct implicating rights distinct from bodily injury and
property damage.
Next, the court addressed whether the complaints in the three
litigations alleged conduct that amounted to personal injury. The
insurance policy defined "personal injury" as "injury arising out of one or
more of the following offenses committed during the policy period:
(2) wrongful entry or eviction or other invasion of the right of private
occupancy. . . ." Nuisance and trespass can be characterized as personal

injury under this definition. Therefore, the Muniz complaint constituted
personal injury, and Great American was obligated to defend Helwig in
that case. The court found that the facts of the Precision complaint could
not be characterized as requesting relief for personal injury as it did not
seek compensation for violation of any rights of private injury. This claim
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for public nuisance alleged that the PCE and TCE contaminated a local
water supply. The court held that Great American did not have a duty to
defend Helwig in Precision. The LeClerq complaint did not explain the
specific conduct for which contribution from Helwig was sought. Thus,
the court did not determine whether there was a personal injury or whether
Great American had a duty to defend or indemnify Helwig in it.
The district court granted in part and denied in part Helwig's
motion for judgment on the pleadings. It granted in part and denied in part
Great American's motion for judgment on the pleadings as well.
LEAH M. CLUBB
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